

ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES

3-5 APRIL 1974

THIRD ANNUAL INTERSERVICE DEFENSE POLICY
CONFERENCE AT USAF ACADEMY

NAVY review(s) completed.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
02840

PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE FOR 3 - 6 APRIL 1974

Wednesday, 3 April

(Service Dress Blue)

0600 - Depart by President's car for T.F. Green

0700 - Allegheny Flight 486

0810 - Arrive National Airport - Met by CNO car

0845 - Call on RADM Grojean

0900 - Call on CNO

0915 - Call on SecNav

0945 - CNO car to Arlington Annex

1000 - Call on RADM Bill Read

1050 - CNO car to National Airport

1115 - United Flight 277

1209 - Arrive O'Hare/Chicago

1340 - Continental Flight 17

1555 - Arrive Colorado Springs - Met by USAFA representative

1800 - Informal buffet

2000 - Address to Cadet Defense Policy classes

RON BOQ

Thursday, 4 April

0700-0800 Breakfast

0830 - Conference convenes

(Lunch with Cadet Wing)

1830 - Cocktails

1930 - Dinner followed by Address

Friday, 5 April

0645 - Breakfast

0730 - USAFA car to Airport

0800 - Continental Flight 20

1157 - Arrive O'Hare/Chicago

1305 - American Flight 283

1501 - Arrive Cincinnati. Met by NRTC car (LCDR TRAMMEL)

1600 (1 hr) - Arrive The Springs Motel, 2020 Harrodsburg Road,
Lexington, Kentucky

1745 - Drive to University of Kentucky Faculty-Alumni Club, Spindletop
Hall, Ironworks Pike

1815 - Refreshments in Rathskeller

1900 - Dinner

2000 - 2200 Session #3 "The Military and American Society" : Moskos

RON at The Springs

Saturday, 6 April

0700 - Breakfast at The Springs with local Naval Reservists

0830 - Session #4 - "Issues and Challenges with the U.S. Military: An
Insider's Perspectives" - VADM Turner

Roundtable chaired by COL Brindel, Director, Army ROTC,
University of Kentucky

1000 - Break

1015 - Session #5 - "Trends in U.S. Defense Policy" - Vince Davis

1230 - Depart for Cincinnati by NRTC car

(1 hr)
1524 - Allegheny Flight 818

1755 - Arrive Logan/Boston. Met by President's car

1930 - Arrive NavWarCol

PEOPLE

<u>WASHINGTON</u>	<u>Room #</u>	<u>Telephone #</u>
RADM Grojean	4E572	OX-52453
CNO	4E660	OX-56007
Chief Carpenter	4E658	OX-54412
SecNav	4E710	OX-53131
RADM Read	BuPers 2Z11--	OX-41291
(Mr. John Manwell	1776 K St. NW	833-8400)
<u>USAFA: Conference</u>		AVN 259-2270
BOQ	Suite	259-3127
MAJ Doug Murray	Home	259-1389

KENTUCKY

<u>The Patterson School</u>	(606) 257-4666/7
The Springs Motel (Qtrs)	277-5751
Spindletop Hall (Friday)	252-3488
Trustees Lounge & Board Room (Sat)	258-8233

Mrs. William Drews - 175 E. Delaware Place, Apt 8803 (312) 664-5342
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Mr. Richard D. Harza - 150 South Wacker Drive, Chicago- Office:
(312)- 855- 7000
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Mr. C. Keith Shay - 445 Cedar St., Winnetka

Mr. LeRoy F. Nicholson -- 18 Lindenwood Drive, (303) 798-5718
Littleton, Colorado

Mr. Brady Black - Cincinnati Enquirer (513) 721-2700

Trip folder

↓ BANQUET
USAF OFFICERS
OPEN MESS
4 April 1974



3rd ANNUAL
INTER-SERVICE
DEFENSE POLICY
CONFERENCE

EVENTS

1830 Cocktail Hour, Reception Lounge

1930 Banquet, Gold Room

Crispy Garden Salad
Filet Mignon
Bake Potato
Sour Cream or Butter
Belgian Glazed Carrots
Rolls and Butter
Hearty Burgundy Wine

2015 Cigar Break

2030 Dessert

Compote of Melon Balls
and Orange Sherbet
Coffee

2045 Banquet Address:

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner
President, Naval War College

2145 No-Host Bar



VICE ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, US NAVY
President, US Naval War College

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner became the 36th President of the Naval War College on June 30, 1972. He is the youngest flag officer and only Rhodes Scholar ever to assume the presidency of the Navy's senior graduate level educational institution.

A native of Highland Park, Illinois, Vice Admiral Turner entered Amherst College in 1941 and 2 years later transferred to the US Naval Academy at Annapolis. After graduation he served a year at sea before entering Oxford University where his studies as a Rhodes Scholar led to a Master's Degree.

After Oxford, he held a variety of sea assignments, including command of a minesweeper, a destroyer and a guided missile frigate which he placed in commission. His shore duties included the Politico-Military Policy Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, the Advanced Management Program at the Harvard Business School and Executive Assistant and Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.

He was selected for promotion to Rear Admiral in May, 1970 and shortly thereafter assumed command of a Carrier Task Group of the SIXTH Fleet in the Mediterranean aboard the aircraft carrier USS Independence. After that and just prior to his assignment as War College President, he served as Director of the Systems Analysis Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 1974

Détente: The Balance Sheet



Michael Mathias Pruchit

By Hans J. Morgenthau

Détente has had a bad press of late on both sides of the fence that was once called the Iron Curtain. A national weekly writes of "Détente: End of Illusions." A Soviet general states that "political détente cannot be durable and irreversible if the arms race continues." On the other hand, the President and Secretary of State inform us that détente serves the purpose of avoiding nuclear war.

In order to gain perspective on such sweeping statements it may not be superfluous to remind oneself of the literal meaning of détente.

The word refers to the previous existence of tension that has been abated or eliminated in consequence

posed in such concrete, specific terms, the question requires a positive answer with regard to three kinds of tensions that have in the past poisoned the relations between the superpowers.

One manifestation of détente is the removal from over-all Soviet-American relations of the ideological fervor that during the Cold War transformed every contest into a Manichean conflict between good and evil, making negotiated settlements virtually impossible. This ideological decontamination has improved the atmosphere, an improvement that in an intangible fashion has improved the chances for the negotiated settlement of substantive issues.

Another manifestation of détente is the substantial settlement of the German question through West German recognition of the territorial status quo in Central Europe and, more particularly, of the East German state, and through agreement on the international status of West Berlin.

The 1972 agreements on the strategic arms limitation for offensive nuclear weapons, have partially eliminated the ideological fervor that transformed every contest into a Manichean conflict between good and evil, making negotiated settlements virtually impossible. This ideological decontamination has improved the atmosphere, an improvement that in an intangible fashion has improved the chances for the negotiated settlement of substantive issues.

That short list of instances where détente has been successful is counterbalanced by a long one of issues that have remained unaffected by détente and may even have been aggravated by its partial achievement.

That is particularly true of Europe, where the conferences on European security and on mutual and balanced troop reductions are deadlocked and where the very fact of détente in Central Europe and the apparent overall détente between the United States and the Soviet Union have accentuated the disintegrative tendencies within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the Middle East, the two superpowers compete for power and influence, as they do in the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean. The thrust of Soviet expansion from the eastern Mediterranean through the Middle East to South Asia, supported by rapidly increasing naval power and movement in to the empty spaces left by the liquidation of the colonial empires, is likely to create new points of tension.

Two factors are bound to put into question the few instances of real détente achieved: the deadlock of the present strategic-arms negotiations and the American reaction to certain domestic policies of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet general quoted here on "political détente" has indeed a point. The continuation of an unlimited nuclear arms race will create tensions wiping out the limited gains made by détente thus far.

For since each side will suspect the other of seeking a first-strike capability, such an arms race will introduce an element of instability into the present balance of terror, which—and not détente—has actually prevented the outbreak of nuclear war.

While this development is still a matter of conjecture, the negative impact of the domestic policies of the Soviet Union upon détente is an observable fact.

American concern with these policies is not, as Soviet spokesmen would have it, meddling in the domestic affairs of another country. Rather it reflects the recognition that a stable peace, founded upon a stable balance of power, is predicated upon a common moral framework that expresses the commitment of all the nations concerned to certain basic moral principles, of which the preservation of that balance of power is one.

As long as the excesses of domestic brutality in the Soviet Union indicate the absence of such a common moral framework, détente can only be limited and precarious.

Hans J. Morgenthau is Leonard Davis Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the City College of the City University of New York.

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Fowler 10/25/73 Wilson - Strategy

Under peace discrete concepts - Amer had
Only Civil War - WWII

Wilson pragmatic - legit modish rhetoric

Wilson's rejection of alliance after joining
war - General House had

Note - politicians reluctant & full coop
while mil coordinated smoothly

Rokeach - The Open and the Closed Mind

". . . persons who are high in ethnic prejudice and/or authoritarianism, as compared with persons who are low, are more rigid in their problem-solving behavior, more concrete in their thinking, and more narrow in their grasp of a particular subject; they also have a greater tendency . . . to be intolerant of ambiguity."



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THE DENVER POST Thurs., April 4, 1974

Navy's Priority On Sea Control

By JIM GIBNEY

Post Colorado Springs Correspondent

AIR FORCE ACADEMY, Colo. — The U.S. Navy is giving higher priority to sea control as the United States depends more and more on importing raw materials, Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner said in a speech at the Air Force Academy Wednesday night. Turner is commandant of the Naval War College.

At the end of World War II, Turner said, the United States had such little opposition in the world that "we didn't put much emphasis on sea control—there wasn't anybody who could contest our ability to control the seas."

"About 1965," he said, "we began to appreciate there was a real Soviet Navy. And now, we're appreciating even more that the importing of raw materials to this nation is increasing and sea control is becoming more important to the United States than it was before."

And, he said, what the other nations of the world perceive is the relative capability of the U.S. and Soviet naval forces affects the political and military decisions made in the other nations.

Turner told a reporter after his talk that although some members of Congress have expressed the opinion the United States ranks behind the Soviet Union as a military power, the admiral said he isn't of the opinion this country ranks second as a naval power to the Soviet Union.

And while the Russians have 300 submarines to 100 in the U.S. Navy, Turner said the United States has more nuclear subs.

BETTER SUBMARINES

"I don't think we need more numbers of submarines and we have a qualitative advantage because we have better submarines," Turner noted during the interview. "Our job is to maintain sea control. The Soviet Union's mission is to deny the United States and other nations the use of the seas."

"It is actually easier to do the denying," he continued, "than it is to do the asserting. Their mission being different, they have a greater need for submarines than we do."

During his address to about 400 cadets in a Fairchild Hall lecture room, Turner stated, "Our commitments today are not decreasing. Our resources are decreasing. The public and Congress are skeptical of America's detente and large military expenditures. We must

be able to order our priorities in a sensible way and in a way we can explain to a skeptical public, in a way that is explicit and understandable."

"And we must promote inter-service cooperation," he continued, "because neither one of us is going to have all the resources to do the jobs, to produce what we want and what the people of the country want from us."

The admiral, a 1946 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, told the future Air Force officers not to assume that the missions of the Army, Navy and Air Force "are always going to stay the same and are always going to be relevant."

"Please," he urged, "develop a sense of skepticism; develop a sense of not accepting a standard or traditional rationale; develop a sense of rejecting the hackneyed phrases that have supported a military position."

"If all that I know about the Navy," Turner went on, "is that it's sea power, and if all you know about the Air Force is that it's aerospace power, then we're just Madison Avenue types with 'buzz words' that are salesmanship. What we've got to know is the guts about sea power and aerospace power and what makes it work and know all about it."

PEOPLE

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